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Abstract—Privacy has traditionally been a major motivation
for decentralized problem solving. However, even though several
metrics have been proposed to quantify it, none of them is
easily integrated with common solvers. Constraint programming
is a fundamental paradigm used to approach various families
of problems. We introduce Utilitarian Distributed Constraint
Satisfaction Problems (UDisCSP) where the utility of each state is
estimated as the difference between the the expected rewards for
agreements on assignments for shared variables, and the expected
cost of privacy loss.
Therefore, a traditional DisCSP with privacy requirements is
viewed as a planning problem. The actions available to agents
are: communication and local inference. Common decentralized
solvers are evaluated here from the point of view of their
interpretation as greedy planners. Further, we investigate some
simple extensions where these solvers start taking into account
the utility function. In these extensions we assume that the
planning problem is further restricting the set of communication
actions to only the communication primitives present in the
corresponding solver protocols. The solvers obtained for the new
type of problems propose the action (communication/inference)
to be performed in each situation, defining thereby the policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problems (DisCSP),
agents have to find values to a set of shared variables
while respecting given constraints (frequently assumed to have
unspecified privacy implications). To find such assignments,
agents exchange messages until a solution is found or until
some agent detects that there is no solution to the problem.
Thus, commonly agents reveal information during the solution
search process, causing privacy to be a major concern in
DisCSPs [22].
The artificial intelligence assumption is that utility-based
agents are able to associate each state with a utility value [17].
As such each action is associated with the difference between
initial and final utilities. If users are concerned about their
privacy, then such a user can associate a utility value with the
privacy of each piece of information in the definition of their
local problem. Since the users are interested in solving the
problem, they must be also able to quantify the utility each
of them draws from finding the solution. Here we approach
the problem by assuming that privacy has a utility that can
be aggregated with the utility value of solving the problem.
We evaluate how much privacy is lost by the agents during
the problem solving process, by the total utility of each
information that was revealed. The availability of a value from
the domain of a variable of the DisCSP in the presence of
the constraints of an agent, is the kind of information that
the agents want to keep private. For example, proposing an
assignment with that value has a cost quantifying the desire
of the agent to maintain its feasibility private. In traditional
algorithms, agents participate in the search process until an
agreement is found. We investigate the case where, being
utility-driven, an agent may stop its participation if the utility
of the privacy expected to be lost overcomes the reward for
finding a solution of the problem. Simple extensions to basic
algorithms are investigated to exploit the utilitarian model of
privacy.
We then evaluate and compare synchronous and asyn-
chronous algorithms according to how well they preserve
privacy. To do so, we generate distributed meeting scheduling
problems, as described in [16], [8]. In these problems, all
agents own one variable, corresponding to the meeting to
schedule, and the domain is the same for all variables. The
constraints consist in a global constraint that requires all the
variables to be equal, and also a unary constraint for each
agent.
In the next section we discuss previous research concerning
privacy for DisCSPs. Further we formally define the concepts
involved in UDisCSPs. In Section IV we introduce some
extensions to common DisCSP solvers that exploit the util-
itarian model for privacy. After a discussion on theoretical
implications, we present our experimental results in Section V.
We conclude in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Backtracking Algorithms
1) Synchronous Backtracking: The baseline algorithm for
DisCSPs is the Synchronous Backtracking (SyncBT), as pre-
sented in [23]. SyncBT is a simple distribution of the standard
backtracking algorithm. The agents start by determining a
hierarchy between them. The higher priority agent then sends
a satisfying assignment of its variable to the next agent with
an ok? message. The recipient adds to it an instantiation of
its own variable while respecting its constraints, and contin-
ues likewise. If an agent is unable to find an instantiation
compatible with the current partial assignment it has received,
the agent sends a nogood message to the previous agent in
the hierarchy. The process repeats until a complete solution is
built, or until the whole search space is explored. The main
efficiency concern is that, since the messages are being sent
sequentially, it does not take advantage of possible parallelism.
2) Asynchronous Backtracking: Asynchronous Backtrack-
ing (ABT) [23], allows agents to run concurrently. Each agent
finds an assignment of its variable and communicates it to
the others agents, having constraints involving this variable.
Agents then wait for incoming messages. They receive an
ok? message containing an assignment from a related higher
priority agent, at the beginning of the resolution and also each
time such an agent changes its assignment to avoid constraint
violation.
An agent eventually receives values proposed by the agents
it is connected to by incoming links. These values form a
context called agent view. When an agent receives an ok?
message, it integrates the received assignment into its agent
view and checks whether its own solution is consistent with
it. If it is not the case, the agent’s assignment is changed.
The negation of a subset of an agent view preventing
an agent from finding an assignment that does not violate
any of its constraints, is called a nogood. If an agent infers
a nogood from its constraints and its agent view, the
assignment of the lowest priority agent involved in the nogood
has to be changed. A nogood message communicates to
that agent the nogood, which is treated by its recipient as
a new constraint and can cause it to change its assignment
and generate corresponding ok?, addlink() or nogood
messages.
B. Privacy
In air traffic control [12], each airport has to allocate each
takeoff and landing slots to the different flights. Even if airlines
need combinations of slots to operate sequences of flights,
slots are currently allocated individually. Such coordinated
decisions are often impossible because of the need to keep con-
straints private [5]. Thus, privacy has been an important aspect
for DisCSP solving algorithms. Recently, privacy preserving
algorithms have also been developed for solving distributed
constraint optimization problems [10] [19].
In existing works, there are two main approaches to enforce
privacy. The first one uses cryptographic techniques. The main
problem of these methods is that cryptographic protocols can
be much slower, which often makes them impractical [11]. The
second approach is based on using different search strategies
to minimize privacy loss, as defined by certain privacy metrics.
In this section we exemplify methods using these approaches.
1) Sample Cryptographic Technique: As an example of
cryptographic technique, the approach described in [24],
achieves a high level of privacy using encryption, giving more
importance to privacy than to the efficiency of the resolu-
tion. It consists of using randomizable public key encryption
scheme. In this algorithm, three servers (value selector, search
controller and decryptor) receive encrypted information from
agents and cooperate to find an encrypted solution. Relevant
parts of the solution are then sent to each agent. This method
guarantees that no information is leaked to other agents. It
also guarantees that, thanks to the renaming of values by
permutation, servers cannot know the actual values they are
dealing with. We now investigate methods that do not use
cryptography.
2) Distributed Private Constraint Satisfaction Problems:
A framework called Distributed Private Constraint Satisfaction
Problems (DisPrivCSPs), is introduced in [7], [18], modeling
the privacy loss for individual revelations. It also models the
effect of the privacy loss by assuming that agents may abandon
when the incremental privacy loss overcomes the expected
gains from finding a solution. Each agent pays a cost if the
feasibility of some of its tuple is determined by other agents.
The reward for solving the problem is given as a constant.
Those concepts were so far used for evaluating qualitatively
existing algorithms, but were not integrated as heuristics in the
search process. Privacy and the cost/utility usual optimization
criteria of Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems are
merged in [4] into a unique criterion.
3) Valuations of Possible States: The Valuations of Possible
States (VPS) framework [15], [14], [9] measures privacy loss
by the extent to which the possible states of other agents
are reduced [21]. Privacy is interpreted as a valuation on
the other agents’ estimates about the possible states that
one lives in. During the search process, agents propose their
values in an order of decreasing preference. At the end of
the search process, the difference between the presupposed
order of preferences and the real one observed during search
determines the privacy loss: the greater the difference, the
more privacy has been lost.
4) Partially Known Constraints: The Partially Known Con-
straints (PKC) model [2], uses entropy, as defined in infor-
mation theory, to quantify privacy and privacy loss. In this
method, two variables x1 and x2 owned by two different
agents may share a constraint. However, not all the forbidden
couples (x1, x2) are known by both agents. Each agents only
knows a subset of the constraints. During the search process,
assignment privacy is leaked through ok? and nogood mes-
sages, like in standard algorithms. This problem is solved
by not sending the value that is assigned to a variable in
a ok? message, but the set of values compatible with this
assignment. For nogood messages, rather than sending the
actual assignments, an identifier is used to specify the state of
the resolution and is used to check if some assignments are
obsolete or not.
III. CONCEPTS
The Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DisCSP)
is the formalism commonly used to model constraint problems
distributed between several agents. It is represented by a
quadruplet 〈A, V,D,C〉 where:
• A: a set of agents.
• V : a set of variables, each one being owned by a distinct
agent.
• D: a set of domains, each of them defining available
values for the corresponding variable.
• C: a set of constraints, each constraint being a relation
imposed between two variables (i.e, x1 = x2).
An agent that reveals an assignment to another agent, incurs
a cost. Once the information is revealed, we consider that it
becomes public, meaning that revealing it to yet another agent
will not degrade its privacy.
Example 1. Suppose a meeting scheduling problem between
a professor and two students. They all consider to agree on a
time to meet on a given day, to choose between 8am, 10am
and 2pm. For simplicity, in the next sections, we will refer
to these possible values by their identifier: 1, 2, and 3. The
Professor A1 is unavailable at 2pm, Student A2 is unavailable
at 10am, and Student A3 is unavailable at 8am.
There can exist various reasons for privacy. For example,
Student A2 does not want to reveal the fact that he is busy
at 10am (because he secretly took a second job at that time).
The value Student A2 associates with not revealing the 10am
unavailability is the salary from the second job ($2.000). The
utility of finding an agreement for each student is the stipend
for their studies ($5.000). This is an example of privacy for
absent values or constraint tuples.
Further Student A3 had recently boasted to Student A2 that
at 8am he interviews for a job, and he would rather pay
$1.000 than to reveal that he is not. This is an example of
privacy for feasible values of constraint tuples.
Thus, corresponding agents associate a cost of 1 to the
revelation of their availability at 8am, equals to 2 for the
one at 10am, and equals to 4 for the one at 2pm. The reward
from finding a solution is 5.
a) DisCSP: The DisCSP framework models this problem
with:
• A = {A1, A2, A3}
• V = {x1, x2, x3}
• D = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}
• C = {x1 = x2 = x3, x1 6= 3, x2 6= 2, x3 6= 1}
As it can be observed, DisCSPs cannot model the details
regarding privacy considerations. Now we will show how
existing extensions model the remaining details.
With DisPrivCSPs the additional parameters are P , to
specify the privacy coefficient of each value, and R, to specify
the rewards of each coefficient.
• P = {PA1 , PA2 , PA3} = {(1, 2, 4), (1, 2, 4), (1, 2, 4)}
• R = {RA1 , RA2 , RA3} = {(5), (5), (5)}
As we see, this framework successfully models all the
information described in the initial problem and also measures
the privacy loss for each agent. However, it was not yet
investigated what is the impact of the interruptions when
privacy loss exceeds the revenue threshold, or how agents
could use these information to modify their behavior during
the search process to preserve more privacy.
b) VPS: For this problem, with the VPS framework, the
3 participants have to suppose an order of preference between
all different possible values for each other agent. As agents
initially do not know anything about others agents but the
variable they share a constraint with, they have to suppose an
equal distribution of all possible values for all other agents,
meaning that they do not expect the feasibility of any value
to be less secret, and so proposed first. In this direction one
needs to extend VPS to be able to also model the kind of
privacy introduced in this example.
c) PKC: With PKC, the individual unavailabilities are
only known by the corresponding participant. Only the junc-
tion of information known by the two agents over a given
constraint can reconstruct the whole problem.
• A = {A1, A2, A3}
• V = {x1, x2, x3}
• D = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}
• C = {{x1 = x2 = x3, x1 6= 3},
{x1 = x2 = x3, x2 6= 2},
{x1 = x2 = x3, x3 6= 1}}
Extensions of PKC can also be proposed to model our
example by adding extra parameters for specifying the quan-
titative information about privacy, as shown below. Next we
introduce a framework that can both specify the quantitative
input details, and can help agents in their search process.
d) UDisCSP: While some previously described frame-
works do model the details of our example, it has until now
been an open question as to how they can be dynamically used
by algorithms in the solution search process.
We propose to recast a DisCSP as a planning problem. It
can be noticed that the rewards and costs in our problem bear
similarities with the utilities and rewards commonly manip-
ulated by planning algorithms [13]. As such, we propose to
define a framework which, while potentially being equivalent
in expressing power to existing DisCSP extensions, would nev-
ertheless explicitly specify the elements of the corresponding
family of planning problems.
We introduce the Utilitarian Distributed Constraint Satis-
faction Problem (UDisCSP). Unlike previous DisCSP frame-
works, besides results, we are also interested in the solution
process. A policy is a function that associates each state of an
agent with an action that it should perform [17].
We define an agreement as a set of assignments for all
the variables with values from their domain, such that all the
constraints are satisfied.
Definition 1. A UDisCSP is formally defined as a tuple
〈A, V,D,C, U,R〉 where:
• A = 〈A1, ..., An〉 is a vector of n agents
• V = 〈x1, ..., xn〉 is a vector of n variables. Each agent
Ai controls the variable xi.
• D = 〈D1, ..., Dn〉 where Di is the domain for the
variable xi, known only to Ai, and a subset of {1, ..., d}.
• C = {c1, ..., cm} is a set of interagent constraints.
• U = {u1,1, ..., un,d} is a matrix of costs where ui,j is the
cost of agent Ai for revealing whether j ∈ Di.
• R = 〈r1, ..., rn〉 is a vector of rewards, where ri is the
reward agent Ai receives if an agreement is found.
The state of agent Ai includes the subset of Di that it has
revealed, as well as the achievement of an agreement. The
problem is to define a set of communication actions and a
policy for each agent such that their utility is maximized.
Note that the solution of a UDisCSP does not necessarily
include an agreement. In principle the set of available actions
for agents consist in any communication operator, as well as
any local inference computation.
Example 2. The DisCSP in the Example 1 is extended to
UDisCSP by specifying the additional parameters U,R:
U = {u1,1 = 1, u1,2 = 2, u1,3 = 4,
u2,1 = 1, u2,2 = 2, u2,3 = 4,
u3,1 = 1, u3,2 = 2, u3,3 = 4}.
R = 〈5, 5, 5〉.
The participants are utility-based agents [17] and try to
reach the optimal state.
IV. ALGORITHMS
Now we discuss how the basic ABT and SyncBT algorithms
are adjusted to UDisCSPs. The state of an agent includes the
agent view. After each state change, each agent computes
the estimated utility of the state reached by each possible
action, and selects randomly one of the actions leading to the
a state with the maximum expected utility.
In our algorithms, an information used by agents in their
estimation of expected utilities is the risk of one of their
assignments being rejected. This risk can be re-evaluated at
any moment based on data recorded during previous runs on
problems of similar parameters (e.g, problem density).
The learning can be online or offline. For offline learning
one calculates the number of messages ok? and nogood
sent during previous executions, called count. It also counts
how many messages previously sent lead to the termination of
the algorithm, in variable terminationCount. It calculates
the risk for a solution to not lead to the termination of
the algorithm, called futilityRisk. Alternatively one can
update the count, terminationCount and unsolvedRisk
dynamically whenever the corresponding events happen.
futilityRisk = 1− terminationCount
count
(1)
When ok? messages are sent, the agent has the choice
of which assignment to propose. When a nogood message
is scheduled to be sent, agents also have choices of how
to express them. Before each ok? or nogood message,
the agents check which available action leads to the highest
expected utility. If the highest expected utility is lower than
the current one, the agent announces failure. The result is used
to decide the assignment, nogood, or failure to perform.
We called these modified algorithms SyncBTU and ABTU,
respectively. The algorithms SyncBTU and ABTU are ob-
tained by performing the above mentioned modifications, in
the pseudocodes of SyncBT [23], [25] and of ABT [22].
SyncBTU is obtained by restricting the set of communica-
tion actions to the standard communication acts of SyncBT,
namely ok? and nogood messages. The procedures of a
solver like SyncBT define a policy, since they uniquely iden-
tify a set of actions (inferences and communications) to be
performed in each state. A state of an agent in SyncBT is
defined by an agent-view and a current assignment of the
local variable. The local inferences in SyncBTU are obtained
from the ones of SyncBT by a simple extension exploiting
the utility information available. The criteria in this research
was not to guarantee an optimal policy but to use utility with
a minimal change to the original behavior of SyncBT when
reinterpreted as a policy. In SyncBTU, the state is extended to
also contain a history of revelations of one’s values defining
an accumulated privacy loss, and a probability to reach an
agreement with each action. Similar modifications are done
to ABT to obtain ABTU: the restricted set of communication
of ABTU is composed of ok?, addlink and nogood. The
state and local inferences of ABTU are the same as SyncBTU,
while also containing the set of nogoods.
For ABTU, there are three procedures of ABT that have
to be modified: checkagentview, when nogood, and
backtrack. The new procedure checkagentview is
shown in Algorithm 1 and is obtained by inserting Lines 7
to 10. They test the privacy loss and only continue as usual if
the expected loss is smaller than the expected reward.
For lack of space, we do not include here the modified
versions of the other two procedures of ABTU, since they
are obtained in the same way from the procedures of ABT
in [22], procedure when nogood, 7th line, and procedure
backtrack, 7th line. For SyncBTU, its procedures are
obtained from the procedures of SyncBT in an identical way as
for ABTU and ABT. Since [23] does not provide pseudocode
for SyncBT, we refer the modifications to the pseudocode
presented in [25], function assignCPA, before Line 7, and
function backtrack, before Line 6.
Algorithm 1: procedure checkAgentView in ABTU
Input: D, agentV iew, futilityRisk, reward
Output:
1 when agentV iew and currentV alue inconsistent do
2 if no value in D is consistent with agentV iew then
3 backtrack;
4 else
5 select d ∈ D where agentV iew and d are consistent;
6 currentV alue = d ;
7 if calculateCost(futilityRisk, D, 1) >= reward
then
8 interruptSolving();
9 else
10 send(ok?,(xi;d)) to outgoing links
To calculate the estimated utility of pursuing an agreement
(revealing an alternative assignment), the agent considers all
different possible scenarios of the subsets of values that might
have to be revealed in the future based on possible rejections
received, together with their probability (see Algorithm 2). The
algorithm assumes as parameters:
• the previously calculated futilityRisk (see Equation 1),
• the possible values D, and
• the probability of having to select from D.
The algorithm then recursively calculates the utility of the next
possible states, and whether the revelation of the current value
v leads to the termination of the algorithm, values stored in
variables costRound and costNonTerminal. The algorithm
returns the estimated cost of privacy loss for the future possible
states currently, called estimatedCost.
Algorithm 2: CalculateCost
Input: futilityRisk, D, probD
Output: estimatedCost
1 if only one value is left in the domain then
2 return (marginalCost(value) * probD);
else
3 v = first(D);
4 costRound= calculateCost
(1- futilityRisk, {v}, probD);
5 costNonTerminal= calculateCost
( futilityRisk, D \ {v},
futilityRisk * probD);
6 estimatedCost = costRound+ costNonTerminal;
7 return estimatedCost;
Example 3. Continuing with Example 1, at the beginning of
the computation agent A1 has to decide for a first action
to perform. We suppose the futilityRisk learned from pre-
vious solvings is 0.5. To decide whether it should propose
an available value or not, it calculates the corresponding
estimatedCost by calling Algorithm 2 with parameters: the
learned futilityRisk = 0.5, the set of possible messages
(D = {1, 2, 3}) and probD = 1.
For each possible value, this algorithm recursively sums
the cost for the two scenarios corresponding to whether
the action leads immediately to termination, or not. Given
privacy costs, the availability of three possible subsets of D
may be revealed in this problem: {1}, {1, 2}, and {1, 2, 3}.
The estimatedCost returned is the sum of the costs for
all possible sets, weighted by the probability of their fea-
sibility being revealed if an agreement is pursued. At the
call, costRound = u1,1 ∗ 0.5. In the next recursion for
costNonTerminal, we get costRound = (u1,1+u1,2)∗0.25.
In the last recursion, the algorithm returns (u1,1+u1,2+u1,3)∗
0.25. The estimatedCost obtained is u1,1 ∗ 0.5 + (u1,1 +
u1,2) ∗ 0.25+ (u1,1 + u1,2 + u1,3) ∗ 0.25. The expected utility
(reward+estimatedCost = 5− 3 = 2) of pursuing a solution
being positive, the first value is proposed.
Next is an illustrative example of other ABTU operations.
ProfessorA1 StudentA2 StudentA3
M1(OK?(x1 = 1))
M2(OK?(x2 = 1))
M3(BT (x2 = 1))
M4(BT (x1 = 1))
M5(OK?(x1 = 2)
M6(BT (x1 = 2))
Fig. 1. Interactions between agents during SyncBT
ProfessorA1 StudentA2 StudentA3
M1(OK?(x1 = 1))
M2(OK?(x2 = 1))
M3(OK?(x1 = 1))
M4(BT (x2 = 1))
M5(BT (x1 = 1))
M6(OK?(x2 = 3))
M7(OK?(x1 = 2))
M8(OK?(x1 = 2))
M9(BT (x1 = 2))
Fig. 2. Interactions between agents in ABT
Example 4. With the original SyncBT and ABT, possible
obtained traces are depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respec-
tively. In Figure 2, we see that Student A2 proposes x2 = 1
in message M2 and x2 = 3 in message M6. In this case, the
privacy loss for Student A2 is u2,1 + u2,3 = −1− 4 = −5.
However, with ABTU, we do not only use the actual utility
of the next assignment to be revealed, but estimate privacy loss
using Algorithm 2. After Student A2 has already sent x2 = 1
with M2, it considers sending x2 = 3 with M6. This decision
making process is depicted in Figure 3. If the next value, 2pm,
is accepted, Student A2 will reach the final state while having
revealed x2 = 1 and x2 = 3, for a total privacy cost of u2,1+
u2,3 = −1− 4 = −5. If it is not, the unavailability of the last
value x2 = 2 will have to be revealed to continue the search
process, leading to the revelation of all its assignments for a
total cost of −7. Since both these scenarios have a probability
of 50% to occur, the estimatedCost equals ((−5− 7)/2) =
−6. The utility (reward+estimatedCost) being equal to 5 −
6 = −1, Student A2 has no interest in revealing x2 = 3 and
interrupts the solving. Its final privacy loss is only u2,1 = −2.
The utility of the final state reached by Student A2 being −2
with ABTU, and −4 with ABT, ABTU preserves more privacy
than ABT in this problem.
e) Theoretical Discussion: The introduced UDisCSP
framework can assume without significant loss of generality
that interagent constraints are public. This is due to the fact
that any problem with private interagent constraints (e.g.,
PKC), is equivalent with its dual representation where each
constraint becomes a variable [1]. However, note that privacy
of domains mentioned in [3] is not modeled by privacy of
8am
2pm
10am
∑
i∈{1,2,3}
u2,i = −7
1
1
2
∑
i∈{1,3}
u2,i = −5
1
2
1
2
∑
i∈{1}
u2,i = −1
1
2
Fig. 3. Calculation of cost from Student A2 for all scenarios during ABTU
constraints.
Moreover, the assumption that each agent owns a single
variable is also not restrictive. Multiple variables in an agent
can be aggregated into a single variable by Cartesian product.
Nevertheless some algorithms can exploit these underlying
structures for efficiency, and this has been the subject of
extensive research [6].
The UDisCSP mainly differs from DisCSP from the per-
spective of how solution is defined. It does not define solution
as an agreement on a set of assignments but as a policy
that could eventually reach such an agreement. As such, their
comparison is not trivial, as one compares different aspects.
Theorem 1. UDisCSPs planning and execution is more gen-
eral than DisCSPs solving.
Proof: A DisCSP can be modeled as a UDisCSPs with
all privacy costs equal 0. The obtained UDisCSPs would
always reach an agreement, if possible. Therefore the goal of
a UDisCSP would also coincide with the goal of the modeled
DisCSP. This implies a tougher class of complexity.
The space complexity required by ABTU and SyncBTU in
each agent is identical with the one of ABT and SyncBT, since
the only additional structures are:
• the privacy costs associated with its values (constituting
a constant factor increase for domain storage).
• the variables futilityRisk, terminationCount, count
and ri, which require a constant space.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We evaluate our framework and algorithms on randomly
generated instances of distributed meeting scheduling prob-
lems (DMS). Previous work [20] in distributed constraint
satisfaction problems has already addressed the question of
privacy in distributed meeting scheduling by considering the
information on whether an agent can attend a meeting to be
private. They evaluate the privacy loss brought by an action
as the difference between the cardinalities of the final set and
of the initial set of possible availabilities for a participant.
As different distributions of unary constraints can have an
important impact on privacy leak, we generate two different
types of random problems:
1) Uniform: Where the unary constraints are uniformly
distributed between agents.
2) Tail-constrained: Where the n/2 highest priority agents
have a 3 times lower probability to receive a unary
constraint as compared to the n/2 lowest priority agents,
even though the global density remains the same.
Example 5. Suppose a problem where the two lowest priority
agents have disjuncts sets of availabilities, meaning that these
agents can detect alone that the problem has no solution.
ABTU lets these agents exchange messages from the beginning
of the search process and therefore interrupts it quickly.
However, SyncBTU prevents them from exchanging messages
before all higher priority agents have constructed a partial
solution. Then, SyncBTU requires more messages exchange
and therefore more privacy leak than does ABTU.
The algorithm we use to generate the problem is:
1) We create the variables (one per participant agents).
2) We initialize their domain (possible times).
3) We add the global constraint ”all equals”.
4) Unary constraint are added to variables, to fit the density.
5) For each value of each variable, we generate a revelation
cost uniformly distributed between 0 and 9.
The experiments are carried out on a computer under Win-
dows 7, using a 1 core 2.16GHz CPU and 4 GByte of RAM.
In Figure 4, we show the total amount of privacy lost by all
agents, averaged over 50 problems, function of the density of
unary constraints. The problems are parametrized as follows:
10 agents, 10 possible values, the utility of a revelation is a
random number between 0 and 9, the reward for finding a
solution to the problem is 20. Each set of experiments is an
average esimation of 50 instances for the different algorithms
(i.e, SyncBT, ABT, SyncBTU, ABTU).
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Fig. 4. Evaluation of privacy loss on different random problems
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Fig. 5. Evaluation of privacy loss on instances with different parameters.
TABLE I
GENERAL COMPARISON FOR ALGORITHMS ALONG MULTIPLE METRICS
SyncBT ABT SyncBTU ABTU
PrivacyLoss 2,5 9.0 1,8 5,3
Messages 2,8 531,3 2,3 150,6
Solved 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,2
Interruption 0 0 0,3 0,7
cpuTime(ms) 257,7 1329,1 254,7 910,3
f) Discussion on Experiments: For each algorithm, we
have measured in Table I the privacy loss, the number of mes-
sages exchanges, the number of problem solved, the number
of solvings interrupted to preserved privacy and CPU time.
The Figure 4 shows that synchronous algoriths are better than
asynchronous at preserving privacy. Moreover, SyncBTU and
ABTU are better than SyncBT and ABT at preserving privacy,
respectively. The Figure 5 shows the averaged estimation of
privacy loss per agent, according to the density and the distri-
bution of the unary constraints. We observe that for a density
higher than 0.4, privacy loss is lower for tail-constrained DMS
than it is for uniform DMS, particularly with ABTU. We notice
in Table I that interrupting the solvings to preserve privacy let
agents not only reduce privacy loss by 39% but also reduce
the calculation times by 27%, reduce the number of messages
exchanged by 71% while still solving 98% of the problems
solved by standard algorithms, the interruptions happening
mostly when the problems have no solution.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While many frameworks have been developed recently for
coping with privacy in distributed problem solving, none of
them is widely used, likely due to the difficulty in modeling
common problems. In this article we propose a framework
called Utilitarian Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem
(UDisCSP). It models the privacy loss for the revelation
of an agent’s constraints as a utility function. We present
algorithms that let agents estimate how much privacy will
be lost at the end of the solving process, using information
from previous experience in solving problems. This estimation
is used to modify the agent’s behavior. We then show how
adapted synchronous and asynchronous protocols (SyncBTU
and ABTU) behave and compare them on different types
of distributed meeting scheduling problems. The comparison
shows that SyncBTU can maintain more privacy on random
problems, as compared to both ABTU and original versions
ABT and SyncBT. Some families of problems with particular
properties regarding privacy were also identified.
In future work, we want to investigate how much privacy
is leaked during the solving of different classes of problems.
We also plan to improve the way agents learn from previous
experience, by using not only the density of the corresponding
problems, but also the tightness, the number of variables or
the number of interagent constraints they are involved in.
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